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Abstract The current dominant perspective on addiction
as a brain disease has been challenged recently by Marc
Lewis, who argued that the brain-changes related to
addiction are similar to everyday changes of the brain.
From this alternative perspective, addictions are bad
habits that can be broken, provided that people are moti-
vated to change. In that case, autonomous choice or Bfree
will^ can overcome bad influences from genes and or
environments and brain-changes related to addiction.
Even though we concur with Lewis that there are issues
with the brain disease perspective, we also argue that
pointing to black swans can be important, that is: there
can be severe cases where addiction indeed tips over into
the category of brain disease, but obviously that does not
prove that every case of addiction falls into the disease
category, that all swans are black. We argue that, for
example, people suffering from Korsakoff’s syndrome,
can be described as having a brain disease, often caused
by alcohol addiction. Moreover, the brain changes occur-
ring with addiction are related to choice-behaviour (and
the related notions of willed action), habit formation and
insight, hence essential mental abilities to break the ad-
diction. We argue for a more graded perspective, where
both black swans (severe brain disease which makes
recovery virtually impossible) andwhite swans (unaffect-
ed brain) are rare, and most cases of addiction come as
geese in different shades of gray.
Keywords Addiction . Brain-disease . Bad habit . Free
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Addiction a Brain Disease?
There is no question that addictive behaviours can have
negative effects for the individual, including social prob-
lems, physical harms and premature death. But that in
itself does not imply that it is best described as a brain
disease, the current dominant perspective in biomedical
sciences, clearly stated by the influential scientist and
president of the National Institute on Drug Abuse
(NIDA), Nora Volkow [1], in line with her predecessor
Alan Leshner in an influential paper in Science [2].
Addiction is related to choices that are (potentially) ben-
eficial in the short-run, at the expense of long-term pos-
itive outcomes, a facet of impulsivity known as delay-
discounting [3]. However, association does not imply
causation, and indeed there is both evidence that impul-
sive traits can become more pronounced through engag-
ing in addictive behaviours, and that impulsivity is one of
the risk-factors for the development of addiction [4, 5].
Increased impulsivity is a first example of brain-changes
that can occur with the development of addiction, others
include changes in the systems underlying habit [6, 7],
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negative affect and stress-sensitivity, aptly called Bthe
dark side of addiction^ [10]. Most neurobiologically-
oriented scientists adhere to a model now including all
these different changes in different phases of addiction,
where initially there is increased reward and salience of
drug-cues (positive reinforcement stage), followed by
more automatized habitual responding (compulsive
phase), and in later stages by anhedonia and drug use to
counter negative effects of previous use (negative rein-
forcement) [7, 11, 12]. Note that, in addition to different
phases, these responses may differ from substance to
substance [13], and from person to person, related to
personality characteristics [14]. Further, people typically
take multiple substances, which may further complicate
the exact nature of the brain changes [15]. The question
here is whether these brain-changes should be called a
brain-disease. In his well-written book and accompany-
ing paper, Marc Lewis argues against this perspective
[16, 17]. What are his arguments?
First, Lewis argues that the brain changes all the time,
when we learn a new cognitive ability (e.g., a new
language), a new skill (e.g., skateboarding), or any
new habit. Lewis here cites Doidge: Bthere’s nothing
more fundamental to the human brain than its
plasticity ,^ and adds: BYet neuroscientists who study
addiction seem to have missed the point.^ We doubt
whether the neuroscientists really missed this point, or
merely emphasize that the brain changes are more pro-
found and long-lasting than brain-changes in learning
everyday habits. In fact, Lewis agrees that Bwemust still
ask whether there is something special about addiction
that makes it hard to overcome,^ and then lists Bthree
mechanisms that accelerate our attraction to addictive
rewards and entrench addictive activities-without mak-
ing it a disease.^ ( [17], ms. P. 10). This appears to be an
empirical question: to what extent brain changes related
to substance use disorders are similar to those related to
falling in love, or habits involving rewards (gambling,
gaming), and there appear to be both commonalities and
differences. [18, 19] In fact, parallels in brain function-
ing in pathological gamblers and people with substance
use disorders was an important argument to include
pathological gambling in the addictions cluster in the
DSM5. Of course, that does not prove that both (or
neither) are a brain disease, but does point to a perspec-
tive where some brain-changes are more long-lasting
and severe than others.
A related point concerns the question to what extent
brain changes associated with addiction are more long-
lasting than those related to other bad habits, or again
falling in love. Here Lewis points to some recent research
showing increases in grey matter after prolonged absti-
nence [20]. That is a nice and positive finding, but there
are also numerous studies showing some return of func-
tion in some areas, but not in others, as recently reviewed
[21]. In fact, many studies in this area report no full return
of function after abstinence, because the abstinent ex-
patients don’t reach normal levels of functioning.
However, without a baseline measurement of functioning
before the addiction, it cannot be ruled out that the
suboptimal functioning may have been a premorbid fac-
tor, rather than an effect of the substance use [21]. Recent
evidence not only points to excessive use as a cause of
brain damage, but also to the number of detoxifications,
which was shown to be related to functional damage in
shifting in a reward task [22–24]. In summary, it seems
fair to say that there can be some return of functioning
after breaking with an addiction, but clearly there is also
evidence for the opposite pattern, and this should be
investigated further, ideally with baseline measures of
functioning (which might happen with recent large scale
longitudinal studies underway [25]).
A second argument is that the brain-disease perspec-
tive may be demoralizing for individuals. That may be
true for some, and indeed there is some research
pointing in this direction: for example, smokers who
viewed smoking as an addiction had more troubles in
quitting than smokers who viewed it as a bad habit [26].
When you believe you have lost your free will you can
more easily shrug your shoulders, because you are ac-
tually not to blame. However, one could also argue the
opposite (and in his introduction, Lewis points to this as
well): the brain-disease perspective freed addicted peo-
ple and their families from some of the social stigma
related to the moral perspective on addiction. When
addiction is a brain disease, immoral behaviours are less
accountable than when it is the consequence of one’s
immoral choices. But in the end this is not a central
argument: the central question is whether addiction can
best be seen as a brain disease or not, given the current
state of the scientific knowledge. The secondary ques-
tion is then how this is best transmitted and what the
societal impact is of either message.
What is addiction then according to Lewis? Is it the
same as any other result of our ever- learning and
changing brain? Lewis proposes that addiction is a bad
habit, which is in line with current neurobiological
theories that emphasize the gradual change in addiction
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from motivated choice to compulsive behaviour, which
is accompanied by a change in control from neural
circuits involving the ventral striatum to circuits involv-
ing the dorsal striatum [6, 7]. The beautifully portrayed
cases in Lewis’ book show that, contrary to popular
belief, you can stop your addiction with enough will-
power without any special treatment. And in fact, that’s
what many people with addictions do. Just like when
you fall in love, drug use is a motivated repetition that
gives rise to deep learning. Desire is the number one
emotional state that drives learning. Lewis then de-
scribes three specific mechanisms that make addiction
exceptionally hard-to-overcome habits.
The first is a narrowed beam of attention for immedi-
ate reward and delay-discounting. According to Lewis
this is exactly the state addicts find themselves in again
and again. This is related to cognitive biases, which have
indeed been related to addiction, and the good news is
that they can be overcome through specific targeted
training methods [27–30]. The second mechanism is that
addictive rewards enlarge motivation. Our synaptic pat-
terns get reinforced with every repetition (leaning a lan-
guage, cooking, smoking) and the best way to do that is
by boosting that repetition with strong motivation.
Moreover, addictions have short-lasting rewards, and
are often followed by negative affect, which can elicit
the need for new stimulation. Or, in Lewis’ own poetic
style: BAddictive rewards whet the appetite and leave
frustration, loss and depression in their wake^. (ms. P.
11) Third, the addictive habit converges with other habits
that thicken our personality, as in the crystallization of
depressive or anxious traits. And indeed, there is evi-
dence for increased impulsivity with adolescent addictive
behaviour [5]. All in all, addiction is a habit that grows
more quickly and becomes more deeply rooted in our
neural circuitry than other habits, because of the intensity
of the motivation of wanting to repeat them. This
may sound a lot like a brain disease, but the
difference is that Lewis’ perspective is the dynam-
ic and developmental emphasis and the alternative
remedy of further growth as the salivating answer, rather
than repairing the Bbroken brain^ in addiction as the
disease model would suggest.
BTrumping your Genes^ and Motivation
What makes one individual more sensitive than another,
when it comes to the development of addiction? There is
little doubt in the scientific community that both genetic
and environmental factors play an important role in
individual differences in vulnerability for addiction
[31]. What is interesting about Lewis’ position is that
he takes people’s choices and conscious processing to
be the ultimate cause of addiction and, vice versa, the
ultimate cure of the plastic brain. His cases of Natalie,
Brian, Donna, Johnny and Alice illustrate this. What this
also tells us is that human agency is critically involved in
the process. As the famous geneticist Kendler once put it
in a lecture: you can have a lot of genetic risk factors
increasing your vulnerability for addiction and still
Btrump your genes^ by deliberately choosing to
not start using an addictive substance when you
know you are at risk (for example, because other family
members developed an alcohol problem, you decide to
never drink alcohol).
The motivation people gather to stop with their ad-
diction makes use of the capacities of the mind. So, if
addiction would be a brain disease where the capacity
for autonomous choice is lost (in everyday language
closely related to the philosophically difficult notion of
Bfree will^), then the capacity to have the necessary
clarity of mind to change the detrimental addictive be-
haviour could be gone. And that is exactly what Volkow
and other proponents of the disease-model have pro-
posed. [1, 9] So, the cases described in Lewis’ book
make clear that even people suffering from severe ad-
dictions can sometimes have enough willpower to suc-
cessfully change. In this positive scenario this mental
capacity can function as an engine for positive change in
the plastic brain, in line with the developmental model
of Lewis. Similarly, Bill Miller argued that studying
mechanisms in spontaneous recovery can help to devel-
op effective interventions [32], and indeed, motivational
interviewing, the therapeutic technique based on this
insight, has been found effective in the treatment of
addiction and beyond [33].
Black Swans and a Gradual Model of Addiction
Although Lewis’ book is to be applauded for falsifying
the idea that addiction is an incurable brain-disease, at
the same time it is clear that not all cases of addiction are
as rosy as the ones described in his book. In fact,
addictions are among the most costly of all mental and
brain disorders [34]. If, for example, Lewis had written a
book on six cases of alcohol-dependence with
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Korsakoff’s syndrome (KS),1 a very different picture
would have emerged: even if good resolutions are made,
the affected brain is bound to forget them again [35].
It might be argued that the inclusion of KS as a
consequence of alcohol addiction is problematic. One
can have this condition through reasons not related to
alcohol abuse, and not all people with alcoholism de-
velop KS. However, we would argue that alcoholism is
closely related to KS. In developed countries where
people have a sufficient amount of thiamine in their
diets, thiamine deficiency (the cause of KS) is almost
always caused by alcoholism. [36] Regarding the re-
verse relationship: there are only a few estimates of how
commonKS is among alcoholics, but in autopsy studies,
brain abnormalities characteristic of KS were present in
about 13 % of alcohol-dependent patients. [37]
Additionally, it is shown that most alcohol-dependent
patients with cognitive impairment show at least some
improvement in brain structure and functioning when
abstinent for a time, meaning there is a definite link
between alcoholism and cognitive ability. [38–40] Of
course, this does not indicate that KS has a unique
relation to alcoholism, but one could argue that the
relationship with this brain-disease is far from trivial.
Furthermore, other studies point to the fact that drug
dependence can impair faculties of the brain that are
crucial in recovering from addiction. [9, 22, 41] For
instance, neuroimaging studies show an emerging pat-
tern of generalized PFC dysfunction in drug-addicted
individuals related to higher levels of drug use, worse
PFC-related task performance and greater likelihood of
relapse. [42]
We would argue that this shows that in some in-
stances, severe drug and alcohol-dependence can dam-
age the brain so severely that autonomous choice is
largely lost. So from our perspective, the interesting
empirical question would be who describes the white
swans and who describes the black swans of addiction:
is a brain disease the exception or the rule? Given that
epidemiological data demonstrate that most cases of
addiction cure without treatment, Lewis (and others like
Heyman [43]), might be right that the rule is more that
addictions are excessive cases of normal motivational
mechanisms and habit formation [44], but, as argued
above, there are also more severe cases, where the term
brain-disease might bemore appropriate. And the severe
cases (often with lots of other problems) are more likely
to seek professional treatment, because they did not
manage to break the addiction without professional
help. And indeed, the long-term outcomes of
addiction-treatment are less positive, with a large ma-
jority relapsing within three years [45]. Hence, we think
there is merit in the developmental model of addiction
proposed by Lewis (and others [46, 47]), and that in-
deed, in many emerging cases in the population, the
term Bbrain-disease^ may be overly strong, but that in
clinical populations there appear to be also cases where
the term is justified. The interesting question is where to
draw the line.
What Do we Lose when we Are Addicted?
If addiction is a brain disease in which autonomous
choice is threatened, it would be important to situate
this claim within the debate on neuroscience and Bfree^
will. To cite Wegner (2004, p. 657): BMost of us think
we understand the basic issue of free will and determin-
ism. The question seems to be whether all our actions
are determined by mechanisms beyond our control, or
whether at least some of them are determined by our free
choice.^ [48] However, it is important to distinguish
between the actual mechanisms leading to action
(which, as few will dispute, are produced by brain
processes, given a learning history and genetic make-
up), and the first-person feeling of free will. According
to Wegner (2004), will is an authorship emotion, a
somatic marker that authenticates the action’s owner as
the self. This may or may not correspond to the actual
causes, but it also serves a function: it allows us to
maintain a sense of responsibility for our actions. In this
sense, the disease view argues that autonomy (or its
counterpart Bfree will^) may get lost in addiction, be-
cause the diseased brain determines the choices made in
a reflexive way, given certain environmental (addiction-
related) cues. The KS patient can make the resolution to
quit drinking, but when next presented with a beer, will
likely drink it. However, in many cases even people
dependent on hard drugs have some ability left to
choose other rewards over drugs, as Carl Hart had
already elegantly demonstrated [49].
So what is this Bautonomy^ thing that appears to
gradually and to some extent get lost in addiction?
Most people hold a strong belief in free will: they think
that what they want and will always causally determines
1 As it happens, a specialized clinic is close to his home,maybe the
next book?
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their behaviour. This is one of the building blocks of
civilization and law, but it is demonstrably wrong, as
Wegner and others have demonstrated. [48, 50, 51] By
now, many experiments in psychology and neurosci-
ence have undermined this Bnaïve view^ on free
will/autonomy, and have shown that many aspects of
our decision-making process are not as free as we think.
First, the famous study of Libet demonstrated that neural
signals that reliably predict a subjective feeling of choice
appear about 350 milliseconds before the subjective
experience of that same choice. [52–54] Second,
Wegner and colleagues have demonstrated that you
can carefully manipulate circumstances so that partici-
pants experience Bfree will^, even though this is osten-
sibly untrue. [50, 55, 56] Third, it has been shown that
many other outside awareness may (partially) determine
behaviour. [51, 57] This has led some neuroscientists
(and Bneurophilosophers^) to completely abandon the
notion of free will, which from this perspective is only
an illusion. The story is then that our conscious experi-
ence of agency and autonomy does not reflect actual
agency, and in many cases it might mislead us. It shows
that our non-conscious processes settle matters before
we are ever aware that matters have been settled. It may
seem like we guide our actions, but in reality we only
experience our decision-making processes when it has
already been decided. The research also shows that the
common sense understanding of agency is misleading,
because many elements that move us to act do so with-
out our awareness of them. But that raises the question
concerning what is lost or diminished in addiction, is
that only an illusion [58]?
Clearly the debate on autonomy has not been settled
yet. Libet’s results have been interpreted as evidence
that neural processes determine our decisions well be-
fore we become aware, or these processes prepare a
person’s decision before the person becomes aware of
the preparations. Mele has argued against these strong
interpretations of Libet’s findings [59], and argued that
the results of the study are not strong enough to count
the possibility out that a person can make a decision
consciously. Libet’s findings depend on the assumption
that the neural signals that reliably predict a subjective
feeling of choice reflects preparation to decide. Schurger
argued that we should rather see it as a reflection of
neural noise that gradually increases in neural activity
preceding spontaneous movements, but not in all cases
of intentional movement [60]. The sceptical argument
that our experience of acting is systematically illusory
has been criticized; most notably Shepherd points out
the fact that experiences of free will can be malleable
doesn’t make them systematically illusory. [61] The
studies that most threaten the belief that the human will
is free are those purportedly showing that there are
factors outside awareness that determine behaviour.
Arguably, that only proves that the naïve perspective is
incorrect, according to which Bthe feeling of free will^
[50] always correctly indicates that our will determines
our behaviour. Few people would dispute that, without
buying into the notion that therefore autonomy is always
illusory. In everyday life, many decisions are automa-
tized, whether we drive a car, or engage in a conversa-
tion. Hence, it is interesting that sometimes the Bfeeling
of autonomy^ can be created, while people’s choices
can be shown to be determined by external factors, but
that does not prove that there is no role for willpower in
human decision making.
In current psychological science and cognitive neu-
roscience, one position is in line with this criticism. In
this view, conscious awareness and the feeling of auton-
omy are side effects of the unconscious processes that
determine the choices made, but this conscious aware-
ness does not have a direct causal effect in itself.
However, they do have indirect effects: we have the
ability to simulate non-existing hypothetical situations
(or outcomes of possible choices), and these simulations
may indirectly guide behaviour [62, 63]. This ability has
been related to social communication and language [62],
and to the ability to forego temptations [64].
One interesting theory was developed by Morsella,
who argued that subjective states are necessary to coor-
dinate different kinds of information in a complex mod-
ular brain, to foster adaptive behaviour. According to his
supramodular interaction theory, adaptive behaviour in
humans requires some supramodular response systems
(defined by concerns). The instrumental system is con-
cerned with interactions with the world. The incentive
system is concerned with motivational orientation:
should the organism approach or avoid a stimulus.
Both systems can only interact in the subjective field.
When you try to concentrate on the last pages of your
book you really want to finish, it is possible to ignore
your urge to go to the toilet, but sooner or later this
becomes impossible or you will wet yourself: the com-
peting incentive response system breaks into the subjec-
tive state. This interaction is necessary, because you can
only perform one of the two behaviours at one moment.
Therefore, subjective states are necessary to suppress
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the action tendencies of response systems. [65] Hence,
there appear to be a set of neurocognitive functions
which help us to steer our behaviour, overcome tempta-
tions, facilitate social interactions, that have sometimes
been labelled Bautonomy .^ In severe cases of ad-
diction, cue-elicited incentive processes may dom-
inate the subjective state so strongly that indeed
other signals cannot break through, as witnessed by wet
pants, antisocial behaviours, and fatal accidents such as
suffocating in vomit.
Even though the everyday naïve position on free will
or autonomy (always right when we feel it) is incorrect,
this is not to deny that these functions play an important
role in our lives. One nice metaphor comes from Shariff
and colleagues [63] concerning autonomy (and free
will): we may subjectively feel as if we are operating a
motorboat that we can directly steer to a goal, whereas in
fact we may be operating a sailing boat that we
steer more indirectly by adjusting the sails and
keeping the long-term goal in consideration. And
addictive behaviours can affect these functions,
keeping the long-term goal in view, when there are
distractions around.
Back to Addiction Both psychological faculties could
be affected through addiction: (some of) the processes
that actually determine behaviour which become biased
to repeat the addictive behaviour) and/or the subjective
feeling of free will. We believe that both could play a
role; there is, for example, evidence that addiction
makes one more myopic (weighing immediate conse-
quences more strongly than later ones), which affects
future behaviour (mechanism), but there is also evidence
that the subjective idea that control is lost may affect
future behaviour (apparent in cases of increased diffi-
culty to quit smoking when one sees it as addiction as
opposed to a bad habit). Most likely, the disease view
will be primarily about the first possible type of conse-
quence, related to the mechanisms underlying willed
action: the ongoing desire for a certain substance takes
a toll on autonomy and control. One interesting aspect of
the debate is that here Lewis and Volkow appear to be on
the same side: both recognize the importance of those
mental functions which we describe under the vague
notion of Bfree will^ in overcoming addictive be-
haviours; the debate centers around what is left
after addiction, and what is the norm. We argue that in
most cases this will not be about black or white swans,
but about grey geese.
This position is related to dual process models of
addiction, which argue that in the non-addicted brain,
there is a dynamic interplay between bottom-up impul-
sive processes (e.g., the slight smell of fire may be
rightfully alarming, even though one is doing an exam),
and top-down reflective processes [58]. One should note
that dual system models have been criticized for being
neurally implausible and theoretically fuzzy [66, 67]. As
a solution, neurocognitive models have been proposed
emphasizing temporal dynamics dependent on the rein-
forcement of cognitive functions together with general-
izations of iterative re-processing, in which the features
of cognitive-motivational processes shift from impul-
sive to reflective with more re-processing [68, 69],
which also points to therapeutic interventions that weak-
en the influence of impulsive processes on behavior
[27]. We would argue that this perspective naturally
concurs with a more graded view on autonomy vs. brain
disease in addiction.
Conclusion
Free will, and the related concepts of autonomy, self-
control or the ability to forego direct temptations for the
benefit of more beneficial outcomes in the future, are
dependent on mature brain functioning of circuits in-
volving the frontal cortices and striatum. This ability
develops in childhood [70], and individual differences
in this ability have been related to long-term health
outcomes, including addictions [71]. Moreover, these
brain regions are affected by addictions, but does that
imply that addiction is a brain disease? We argue for a
more continuous perspective, where there are individual
differences in these mental abilities (related to working
memory capacity and other executive functions), and
these abilities can be impaired through addictive behav-
iours, with a lot of individual differences in the extent to
which this is the case, and the extent to which these
abilities can recover [15, 21]. In extreme cases, with a lot
of damage and little or no chance of recovery, the term
brain disease may be in place, such as in alcohol-depen-
dent patients suffering from KS. However, in most
cases the term appears to be too extreme, and the
more developmental dynamic perspective offered
by Lewis and others may be more accurate. And
as a positive by-product, this notion may be a more
efficient engine for change in people affected by addic-
tive behaviours.
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